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Abstract
We ask whether financial assets are well-allocated in the cross-section of firms. Ex-
tending the framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to the liabilities side of the balance
sheet, we estimate the real losses that accrue from the cross-sectional misallocation of
financial liabilities across firms. Using U.S. and Chinese data on manufacturing firms,
we find significant misallocation of debt and equity. Although financial liabilities ap-
pear well-allocated in the United States, they are not in China. If China’s debt and
equity markets were as developed as those in the United States, China would realize
gains of 40-55% in real firm value. We also back out the cost of debt and equity for
each firm with our model, taking into account allocation distortions. We find that
larger firms and firms located in more developed cities face markedly lower costs.
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1. Introduction
Over a decade of research in industrial organization, development, and macroeconomics has
provided convincing evidence that misallocation of capital and labor is significant and can
help explain why developing countries have lower total factor productivity (TFP).1 The mere
existence of such pervasive misallocation begs the question of whether the financial instru-
ments used to purchase capital goods and fund payroll are also misallocated. Indeed, Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) motivate their work on factor misallocation by appealing to distortions
in access to external finance. This paper tackles the question of the cross-sectional allocation
of finance directly, moving to the other side of the balance sheet to quantify the extent of
financial or capital structure misallocation.
Why might there be gains in reallocating debt and equity? Under any trade-off theory
of capital structure—either static or dynamic—firms weigh the benefits and costs of debt
and equity to determine the optimal debt-equity ratio. Informational or agency frictions in
raising funds via either security may then force firms to choose inefficient allocations. For
example, a profitable firm may prefer debt to either internal or external equity finance at the
margin in order to shield profits. However, the firm could face unreasonable loan covenants
because it doesn’t have an established relationship with a bank. Another firm might prefer
equity to debt at the margin if it is already highly levered. However, potential new investors
might not have sufficient information needed to offer a fair price on new equity issuance.
Therefore, even keeping the total amount of debt and equity the same between these two
1Banerjee and Duflo (2005) offers an overview of the misallocation hypothesis in the development literature
while Syverson (2011) surveys the literature from an industrial organization and macroeconomics perspective.
Earlier works such as Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Hopenhayn (1992), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993),
Robert E. Lucas (1978), and Olley and Pakes (1996) provide the theoretical underpinnings of misallocation.
More recent papers such as Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2009), Banerjee and Moll (2010), Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013), Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Chen and Song (2013), Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), Hsieh and Klenow (2014), Jeong and Townsend (2007), Midrigan and Xu (2014), Petrin and
Levinsohn (2012), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) use firm or
establishment level microdata and heterogeneous firm models to investigate the quantitative importance of
misallocation.
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firms, gains are available if debt could somehow be shifted to the first firm from the second
and equity could be shifted to the second firm from the first.
Another potential source of reallocation gains simply comes from moving debt or equity or
both from less efficient firms to more efficient firms. This avenue for reallocation is available
even if debt and equity are perfectly substitutable. There is no inherent theoretical prediction
on whether inefficient allocations of the scale or type of financing is more important, but our
framework is sufficiently flexible to inform this issue.
To provide quantitative evidence on the effects of financial misallocation, we turn to the
empirical framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who base their work on a model of cross-
sectional factor allocation with differentiated products. In their model, the monopolistically
competitive structure creates a downward sloping demand curve, which endogenously limits
firm size even though firms have a constant returns to scale production function. More salient
for their empirical investigations is the intuitive result that the marginal revenue products
of each factor should be equalized across firms in an industry. Distortions in cross-sectional
allocations then break this equality and adversely affect TFP. The greater the dispersion
in factor marginal revenue products within a sector, the greater the potential reallocative
gains.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use establishment level data on the manufacturing sectors in
the United States, China, and India. They find that China and India could realize TFP
gains of 30-50% and 40-60%, respectively, if these countries hypothetically reallocated their
factors of production to achieve the U.S. level of efficiency.
Our model is directly analogous to the setup in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). While they
model the factor mix that directly leads to potential distortions in TFP, we model the
financial liabilities that back these factors and thus also potentially contribute to distortions
in TFP. Of course, we do not literally think that different forms of finance are exactly
equivalent to factors of production. However, it is quite reasonable to imagine that the
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stocks of debt and equity can be aggregated into a measure of benefit to the firm. Moreover,
this aggregation is likely to exhibit decreasing marginal benefits for each different type of
finance. Any model that derives an optimal interior solution for capital structure would lead
to this type of structure.
In our framework, at an optimal allocation, the marginal benefits of debt and equity
finance to total financial benefit should be equal across firms in a sector, and distortions in
these allocations lower productivity. Given this observation, we infer distortions as devia-
tions from the first best which is derived from first-order conditions for optimal allocations.
Empirically, these deviations manifest themselves as large differences (relative to our model)
in the debt-equity ratio across firms in a sector, and these large differences imply poorly
developed financial markets and large gains from reallocation.
Using U.S. and Chinese data on manufacturing firms, we find significant misallocation
of debt and equity. Although financial liabilities appear well-allocated in the United States,
they are not in China. If China’s debt and equity markets were as developed as those in the
United States, 40-55% gains in real firm value would be available. We are also able to back
out the cost of debt and equity for each firm with our model, and analyze the cross-sectional
patterns. For instance, larger firms and firms located in more developed cities face markedly
lower costs.
On the surface, the financial frictions aspect of our study appears most similar to Buera
et al. (2011) and Midrigan and Xu (2014). However, there are substantive differences. For
example, Buera et al. (2011) determine empirically that the manufacturing sector in general
has a larger scale than the service sector across many different countries. This result is
tangentially related to our work because larger scale industries such as manufacturing also
tend to have more external financial dependence than smaller scale industries such as services.
Buera et al. (2011) exploit this observation in a model in which financial frictions affect the
manufacturing sector primarily on the extensive margin, as these frictions prevent talented
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agents from entering this sector. Midrigan and Xu (2014) is also closely related to our
work because they also ask how financial frictions can affect TFP. However, their work is
largely based on a calibrated model, while our work is mostly empirical. In their two sector
model, they find that financial frictions lead to little intensive misallocation but substantial
misallocation across sectors because the more productive sector requires a cost of entry which
is difficult to pay if there are financial frictions.
Like Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), our model has nothing
to say about the extensive margin. The particular type of misallocation we are after comes
from the hypothesis that all forms of finance are not necessarily equivalent. Because we do
recognize that more developed financial markets may cause new firms to enter, our claim is
simply that we provide a lower bound on the extent of capital structure misallocation that
a dynamic model with entry and exit may find.
In the finance literature, our work is related to Graham (2000), who also considers cross-
sectional allocations of debt and equity. However, there are again substantive differences
between our work and his. Graham (2000) computes firm-level estimates of the point at which
the marginal tax benefits of debt begin to decline. A firm that incurs interest deductions
to the left of this “kink” point has an inefficiently low level of debt. Estimates of this
inefficiency imply large amounts of tax benefits left on the table by underleveraged firms:
a puzzle. One notable feature of the framework in Graham (2000) is that he takes relative
prices as given and then interprets deviations from the optimal responses to these prices as
suboptimal behavior. In contrast, we assume that firms behave rationally and then use our
framework to back out the price distortions that lead to the capital structure decisions that
we observe in the data. This alternative perspective seems reasonable in light of the finding
in Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) that the marginal tax rate estimates of Graham (2000)
imply rational behavior when the kink points are derived from more accurate estimates of
future taxable income.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and shows
how the model translates into an empirical framework for measuring misallocation. Section
3 describes the U.S. and Chinese data. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section
5 concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2. Model
Our model closely follows Hsieh and Klenow (2009), which develops a closed-economy version
of Melitz (2003). This section sketches the model, with a description of the environment and
technology, a statement of the optimality conditions, and a description of how to measure
the benefits of reallocation. A full derivation of the model can be found in the appendix.
Environment and technology
Firms in our model are financed by debt and equity. In our model we do not distinguish be-
tween external and internal equity. Given the rarity of seasoned equity offerings (DeAngelo,
DeAngelo, and Stulz 2010), and given that external equity constitutes a negligible source of
funds over the last two decades in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data, we view this
simplification as innocuous for our purposes.
Firms use the proceeds from these financial assets to generate the real benefit of finance,
and the total real benefit of finance in the economy is denoted by F . We assume that the
economy consists of S sectors, and in each sector s, the real benefit of finance is given by
Fs. These sectoral benefits are are combined using a Cobb-Douglas aggregator, as follows:
F =
S∏
s=1
F θss , (1)
in which
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S∑
s=1
θs = 1. (2)
The Cobb-Douglas aggregator implies that increasing the size of any particular sector
while holding the others constant has a decreasing marginal benefit.
We next assume that the real benefit of finance Fs for each sector comes from a CES
aggregate of I differentiated firms, as follows:
Fs =
(
I∑
i=1
F
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
, (3)
in which σ is the elasticity of substitution of the real benefit of finance between firms in a
sector.
Finally, we assume that within an individual firm, debt and equity finance can be ag-
gregated using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function that combines debt and
equity to determine the real benefit of finance:
Fsi = Asi
(
αsD
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)E
γ−1
γ
si
) γ
γ−1
. (4)
In (4), Asi represents financial total financial benefit (TFB), αs ∈ (0, 1) provides the
weight on the importance of debt in generating this benefit, and γ is the elasticity of substi-
tution between debt and equity. It is worth noting that using a CES aggregator represents
an important departure from Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who use a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function. As will be seen below, the CES aggregator gives us flexibility to distinguish
between reallocation gains that come from the amount of finance and the type. Nonethe-
less, this equation constitutes a strong functional form assumption on how debt and equity
generate a real benefit to the firm. This equation also models the generation of benefits
without explicitly modeling a production function with capital and labor. Implicitly, if firms
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ultimately finance their purchases of factors of production using debt and equity, then the
proximate factors—capital, materials, labor, and energy—can be thought of as unmodeled
intermediate inputs.
Note that certain variables are firm-specific, while others are sector-specific. For example,
TFB,Asi, depends on both the sector and firm while the weight αs only depends on the sector.
An important feature of the real benefit function is that there is a decreasing marginal benefit
to each individual financial factor input. A functional form with this property suggests a
trade-off model of capital structure. Naturally, (4) also allows for perfect substitutability
between different forms of finance, but even in this case, reallocation gains within a sector
are possible by moving debt or equity from lower TFB firms to higher TFB firms.
Optimal allocations
Next, we define the prices that enter the firm’s optimization problem. First, we let r and λ
be the costs associated with using debt and equity, respectively. Second, to the extent that
financial market frictions distort these costs, we also need to define “taxes” that represent
reduced-form cost distortions. Specifically, τDsi is a “tax” on debt and τEsi is a “tax” on
equity. Positive values indicate that firms face additional costs of finance. As noted in the
introduction, these costs can arise from such frictions as informational asymmetry, agency
problems, or financial sector underdevelopment. Negative values, on the other hand, suggest
favorable financial relationships and/or government subsidies. We do not model the explicit
mechanisms behind the distortions and assume that the they are well-encapsulated by τDsi
and τEsi .
Given these definitions, the nominal net benefit of finance pisi is given by:
pisi = PsiFsi − (1 + τDsi) rDsi − (1 + τEsi)λEsi (5)
Because the right side of (5), (1 + τDsi) rDsi + (1 + τEsi)λEsi, is the cost of capital, pisi can
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be interpreted as economic value added (EVA), which is a sensible quantity to maximize in a
static model. The one component of (5) that requires more explanation is the interpretation
of Psi. It is somewhat unconventional to specify a price as a choice variable that determines
the nominal benefit of finance, but this feature of our model can be justified as follows. If
a firm has differentiated products, it sets prices in the product market and the benefit of
finance should be related to how well it does on the productive side. Price setting for the
financial side should then be related to price setting for the productive side. In other words,
Psi is the price a differentiated firm would ask for the real benefits it is generating.
An individual firm aims to maximize pisi by choosing Psi, Dsi, and Esi, taking r, λ, τDsi ,
and τEsi as given. To solve the optimization problem, the firm first minimizes the cost of
capital (1 + τDsi) rDsi+(1 + τEsi)λEsi by choosing Dsi and Esi subject to a fixed real benefit
F¯si. Then the firm chooses Psi to maximize the nominal net benefit pisi. The solution to the
firm problem gives:
Psi =
σ
σ − 1
1
Asi
(
(1 + τDsi) r
(
αs + (1− αs)Z−
γ−1
γ
si
)− γ
γ−1
+ (1 + τEsi)λ
(
αsZ
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)
)− γ
γ−1
)
, (6)
in which
Zsi =
(
αs
1− αs
(1 + τEsi)λ
(1 + τDsi) r
)γ
. (7)
The optimality condition (6) naturally shows that price is a markup over marginal cost.
Next, we solve for the sector price Ps as a function of firm price Psi, by defining Ps to be
the minimum price of acquiring a unit of the sector benefit. The solution is:
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Ps =
(
I∑
i=1
P
−(σ−1)
si
)− 1
σ−1
. (8)
Finally, cost minimization of the Cobb-Douglas aggregator across sectors gives:
P =
S∏
s=1
(
Ps
θs
)θs
(9)
in which θs are the weights on each industry, and P is similarly defined to be the minimum
price of acquiring a unit of the aggregate benefit. We assume that the nominal benefit of
finance satisfies value additivity at the sector level and firm level, such that:
S∑
s=1
PsFs = PF
and
I∑
i=1
PsiFsi = PsFs.
From the derivation of P , the industry weights, θs, are found to be the fractions of the
portfolio allocated to each industry, that is:
PsFs = θsPF. (10)
Up to this point, we have made no mention of preferences. Although preferences are
not modeled explicitly, the implicit preferences that produce the results above are CES
preferences over the benefit from firms in a sector and Cobb-Douglas preferences over the
benefit from sectors in the economy.
Reallocation
We now demonstrate how to calculate the gains from reallocation using this framework. To
find the reallocation gains, we first note that we can express financial total financial benefit,
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Asi, as:
Asi = ηs
(PsiFsi)
σ
σ−1(
αsD
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)E
γ−1
γ
si
) γ
γ−1
, (11)
in which
ηs =
1
Ps(PsFs)
1
σ−1
. (12)
The real benefit of finance is unobservable because prices are difficult to measure with any
accuracy. However, the nominal benefit is, in principle, observable. Therefore, Asi can be
measured using available data when written in the form of (11). As shown in the appendix,
the reallocation gains are not affected if ηs is normalized to one for every sector s. Intuitively,
the purpose of reallocation in a sector is to achieve the highest real benefit of finance while
keeping the total amount of debt and equity the same in the sector. As a result, Ds =
∑
iDsi
and Es =
∑
iEsi for every sector s both before and after reallocation.
The efficient levels of debt Dˆsi and equity Eˆsi can be found from the first order conditions
obtained from differentiating the expression for the aggregate benefits in a sector (3) with
respect to these two variables. These optimality conditions are given by:
Dˆsi =
Aσ−1si∑
j A
σ−1
sj
Ds (13)
Eˆsi =
Aσ−1si∑
j A
σ−1
sj
Es. (14)
In (13) and (14), a hat above a variable indicates the efficient level after reallocation. Once
optimal debt and equity are determined, we can write the optimal real benefit of finance for
an individual firm, sector, and economy respectively as:
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Fˆsi = Asi
(
αsDˆ
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)Eˆ
γ−1
γ
si
) γ
γ−1
(15)
Fˆs =
(∑
i
Fˆ
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
(16)
Fˆ =
∏
s
Fˆ θss . (17)
The original, prior to reallocation, real benefit of finance can be computed by replacing
Dˆsi and Eˆsi by the original debt Dsi and equity Esi in (15) above. Therefore, we can quantify
the gains to reallocation by calculating the observed allocation as a fraction of the efficient
allocation. Letting F denote the observed benefit of finance, these gains are given simply by
F/Fˆ .
It is worth discussing the role of the parameters σ and γ in the quantification of these
gains. We first discuss σ, the elasticity of substitution of the real benefit of finance between
firms in a sector. Potential reallocation gains depend positively on σ. To see this point,
consider a case in which firms in a sector are all the same size but their allocations of debt
and equity imply wide dispersion in the benefit of finance, Asi. In this case, moving to the
efficient allocation would result in a great deal of dispersion in firm size, with the much
more productive firms receiving more finance. Thus, overall reallocation gains are greater
when σ is higher. Conversely, a low value for σ implies that reallocating debt and equity
efficiently would result in the most productive firms getting only a modest amount of finance,
so reallocation gains would also be modest.
Turning to γ, the elasticity of substitution between debt and equity, it is intuitive to see
that when γ approaches infinity, debt and equity are perfect substitutes, so the potential
gains from changing the debt-equity mix are zero.
We close this section by showing how to compute the price distortions, τDsi and τEsi . In
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the case of a firm level Cobb-Douglas real benefit of finance function, there is an analytical
expression for taxes as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). However, with a more general CES
function, finding the taxes involves numerically solving the nonlinear system:
Dsi = αs
σ − 1
σ
PsiFsi
(1 + τDsi) r
1
αs + (1− αs)
(
αs
1−αs
(1+τEsi)λ
(1+τDsi)r
)−(γ−1) (18)
Esi = (1− αs)σ − 1
σ
PsiFsi
(1 + τEsi)λ
1
αs
(
αs
1−αs
(1+τEsi)λ
(1+τDsi)r
)γ−1
+ (1− αs)
(19)
for τDsi and τEsi . After the taxes are calculated, we can then back out estimates for the cost
of debt (1 + τDsi) r and equity (1 + τEsi)λ that individual firms face.
3. Data
Most of the variables in our model are readily observable, except the nominal benefit of
finance, PsiFsi. To the extent that the proceeds from security offerings or loans are used
to buy or indirectly pay for factors of production, a natural measure is value-added. One
advantage of this particular measure is that it is readily computable for both public and
private firms in China.
The Chinese data comes from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China and
contains a panel of firms from 1999 to 2007. Firms with more than 5 million Chinese Yuan
(CNY) in sales, or approximately 600,000 U.S. Dollars (USD) during this time period, are
required to provide detailed financial information for the survey. The information provided
includes statistics such as employment, income statement items, balance sheet items, and
after 2004, cash flow items.
The data only contain firms from the mining, manufacturing, and utility sectors. We
focus on the manufacturing sector because the mining sector is relatively small and opera-
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tionally different from manufacturing while the utility sector is highly regulated in China.
In addition, we also remove state-owned and collective corporations, which are also known
as Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). Each firm-year observation is classified as a
private-corporation operating-year if the total state and collective paid-in capital is less than
50%.2 We drop firms with negative and missing value added, total liabilities, and share-
holders’ equity. We also drop firms with less than 5 million 1999 CNY in sales because the
lack of reporting requirements for this group likely results in significant selection bias and
undersampling. After applying these screens, we are left with 1,248,729 remaining firm-year
observations.
We use value added (i.e. the sum of profit, indirect taxes, wages, and depreciation) as our
measure of the nominal benefit of finance, PsiFsi, total liabilities for Dsi, and shareholders’
equity for Esi. This measure of equity is the stock of book equity and thus external equity
finance and retained earnings. These variables are all directly available in the NBS data.
Note that we use total liabilities instead of debt, and the reason behind this choice is twofold.
First, debt is not a separately available data item in the NBS survey, and second, using total
liabilities can offer more robust estimation because there are almost no firms with zero
liabilities. For a CES function without an infinite elasticity of substitution, the marginal
benefit of a factor input is unbounded at zero, and this property of the CES aggregator
would present omitted observation problems in the estimation. These choices for debt and
equity imply that the sum of the two equals total assets.
Summary statistics for this sample are in Table 1. Panel A reports various statistics in
the sample stratified by size, where we use a density breakdown of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%,
20%, 15%, 10%, 5%, so the cumulative density breakdown is 0-5%, 5-15%, 15-30%, 30-50%,
50-70%, 70-85%, 85-95%, 95-100%. This partition is quite attractive because the mean of
2This type of classification is often used since official corporate ownership registrations can lag several
years behind actual ownership changes. For instance, see Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011) for a similar
approach.
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total assets roughly doubles for each size group, with the exception of the largest size group,
which is reflective of the well-known right skewness of the firm size distribution.
In Panel A, we find two patterns in the data of interest. First, the ratio of liabilities to
assets varies little across the different size classes, with the larger firms having only slightly
lower leverage. Second, it is clear from comparing the value-added and assets columns,
that the smaller firms use their assets far more efficiently to produce value-added. This
pattern, juxtaposed with the similarity in leverage across size classes, points strongly to
potential misallocation of capital structure, as firms with different productivities ought to
have different capital structures (Hennessy and Whited 2005).
Panel B presents summary statistics by year. Here, we see that the ratio of liabilities
to assets is little changed over the sample period. Interestingly, the average size of firms
has shrunk somewhat from the beginning to the end of the sample. However, these slightly
smaller firms are creating 40% more value added at the end of the sample than at the
beginning.
For U.S. data, we use Compustat and correspondingly keep only the manufacturing sector
with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 2000 and 3999. We also drop
firms with missing and negative data, keep only the years from 1999 to 2007 inclusive.
Value-added is computed in the same manner as in Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014). First,
labor costs are estimated from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database by multi-
plying the number of employees Compustat variable (EMP) by the mean wage per employee
(PAY/EMP) in the firm’s 3-digit SIC industry. Value-added is operating income before de-
preciation (OIBDP) plus the imputed wages. For Dsi and Esi, we use total liabilities and
shareholders’ equity.
We partition the firms by size according to the same densities as before. Of course,
Compustat is a data set of U.S. public firms, so the average firm is much larger. However, the
observed patterns by firm size can still be informative. Table 2 provides summary statistics
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by firm size and by year. In Panel A, we again present eight firm size categories, and the last
three Chinese firm size categories are approximately equivalent to the first three U.S. firm
size categories. In addition to the results above, we find a hump-shaped relation between
size and leverage for U.S. firms, with the medium-sized firms having the highest leverage.
Also in contrast to the Chinese firms, small and large U.S. firms have approximately the
same ratio of value-added to assets.
Panel B shows two more differences between the Chinese and U.S. firms. First, the U.S.
firms grow from the beginning to the end of our sample. Also, firms become more leveraged
over time.
4. Results
We now use the framework developed in Section 2 to quantify the extent of capital structure
misallocation. Before we present our results, we need to discuss the normalization of several
parameters. First, we set the elasticity of substitution for the real benefit of finance between
firms in an industry to σ = 1.77. Although this choice provides conservative estimates of the
reallocation gains, we also explore below the robustness of our results to this assumption.
Next, the pre-distortion cost of debt and equity is set to r = 0.045 and λ = 0.09. It
should be emphasized that our reallocation results are not sensitive to this normalization
because firms only care about the after tax cost of debt (1 + τDsi) r and equity (1 + τEsi)λ.
Changing r and/or λ only changes the interpretation of the tax distortions relative to the
base cost of debt and equity. The weight on the importance of debt in a sector is set to
αs = rD
1/γ
s /(rD
1/γ
s + λE
1/γ
s ) which is the value when there are no tax distortions. This
assumption is innocuous, as raising r or λ by 0.05 has a less than 1% impact on the overall
reallocation gains. Next, we set the elasticity of substitution between debt and equity,
γ = 2, and again we explore below the robustness of our results to varying the value of this
parameter. Finally, we need to define sectors. Here, we use 3-digit industry classifications
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from the Chinese NBS and 3-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries from
Compustat.
Table 3 contains estimates of the potential gains from the reallocation of finance across
firms in a sector. Each row corresponds to a separate year. The first column shows the
observed U.S. allocation of the real benefit of finance as a fraction of the optimal US alloca-
tion: FUS/FˆUS. The second column shows the corresponding percentage gain from moving
from the observed to the optimal allocation. The next two columns present analogous cal-
culations for Chinese firms. The two columns after that show the Chinese efficiency ratio
as a fraction of the U.S. efficiency ratio: (FChina/FˆChina)(FˆUS/FUS), and the corresponding
percentage gains, in other words, the percentage gains available if China’s debt and equity
markets were as developed as those in the United States. The last two columns provide a
breakdown of misallocation into the misallocation due to scale and due to misallocation of
factors, holding scale fixed.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates. All of
the standard errors are quite small. This result makes sense inasmuch as the figures that we
present are all essentially means, which can be estimated with a great deal of precision with
several thousand data points.
In the first two columns, we see that U.S. public firms stand to gain about 10-13% in
moving to an optimal allocation. The potential gains appear to be less during the boom
periods and greater during the recession during the early part of our sample. This result
makes sense inasmuch as financial frictions are generally regarded to be more severe in
recessions. In the next two columns, we see, somewhat surprisingly, the efficiency of the
allocation of debt and equity appears to worsen over our sample period in China. This
phenomenon can be mostly attributed to the expansion of the NBS survey in the 2004
Industrial Census, which picked up firms that were left out in previous annual surveys.3
3Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2014) discuss the impact of the 2004 Industrial Census on the
NBS survey sample.
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When we restrict our sample to firms that are in the NBS survey before and after the 2004
Industrial Census, the pattern of increasing misallocation is lessened.
The available reallocation gains appear enormous. We find that value-added could poten-
tially be increased by over 60% if the Chinese firms were to move to an efficient allocation.
Although these figures seem large, they are of the same order of magnitude as the estimated
gains found in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) regarding capital and labor allocations.
To put these results in more perspective, we now examine the last four columns in Table
3. The column labeled “relative fractional benefit” shows the efficiency gains in China
relative to the efficiency gains in the United States. This comparison is motivated by the
observation in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) that because a simple static model based on the
framework in Melitz (2003) is likely to be misspecified, a researcher is likely to observe
positive potential gains even when allocations are efficient. This observation is particularly
applicable in our context of financial misallocation because U.S. financial markets are highly
developed. Thus, by comparing the potential gains in China relative to the observed gains
in the United States, we isolate the potential gains in China relative to an assumed efficient
allocation. Here, the results are more modest. We find potential gains of approximately
40-45% before the expansion of the NBS survey, and of approximately 50-55% after the
expansion.
To understand whether these gains come from the amount of finance available to Chinese
firms or to the type of finance, we compare the relative fractional benefit to a case in which
we set γ = ∞. If γ = ∞, then the type of finance does not matter for the aggregate
benefit of finance because debt and equity are perfect substitutes. This exercise produces
an interesting result. We find that the majority of the potential reallocation gains come
from the misallocation of scale. Before the expansion of the NBS survey, we find that only
approximately 4-5% of the gains could be realized by reallocating the type of finance. After
the expansion, this figure rises to 6-7%. This result is interesting because it means that the
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access to finance in general is behind the large potential TFP losses in China.
We next examine the robustness of the reallocation results to the calibration of the
parameters γ and σ, the elasticity of substitutions between debt and equity and elasticity of
substitution between firms in an industry, respectively. These results are in Table 4. First,
we find that allowing γ to range between 1.5 and 10 has a negligible effect our estimates
of percent gains in both the United States and China. By construction, γ has no effect on
the misallocation of scale. However, changing γ does materially alter our estimates of the
percent of of gains that come from reallocating the type of finance, with lower levels of γ
corresponding to more gains. Thus, our estimates in Table 3 can be thought of as upper
bounds, and this interpretation leaves intact our general qualitative result that the vast
majority of potential gains from the the misallocation of scale.
While varying γ has little effect on our estimated reallocation gains, varying σ does. We
find that the estimated gains increase sharply when we increase σ. Intuitively, the firm size
distribution becomes excessively skewed if σ is too large because, in this case, all resources
flow to the most productive firms. In other words, if one were to pick the most productive
Chinese firms in a sector and give them all the resources, the gains would be large because
of the substantial dispersion in productivity.
However, as we have argued above, the calibration of σ is conservative if σ is chosen to be
on the low end. We now expand on these arguments. One way to discipline the choice of σ is
to calculate the distributions of debt and equity when the allocation is efficient and compare
these distributions to the realized distributions in the data. For the United States, when
σ = 1.77, the standard deviation of the efficient size distribution is exactly the same as the
observed standard deviation, that is, the standard deviation of Dˆsi+ Eˆsi equals the standard
deviation of Dsi + Esi. We argue that this choice of σ is very conservative, because if σ is
lower, the efficient size distribution would be more compressed than the observed. However,
when σ rises above 2, the efficient size distribution becomes more and more stretched out
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and the reallocation gains become quite large.
We now examine the implications of our estimates for the cross-sectional distribution of
firm size. Recall that because of downward sloping demand, each firm has a well-defined
optimal size, with an optimal financing mix. Deviations of the financing amount and mix
from the optimal allocation therefore impact firm size, so comparing the distributions of
firm size under the actual and efficient allocations is a useful way to quantify misallocation.
Figure 1 illustrates this idea with plots of the observed and efficient firm size distributions for
the United States and China. We compute observed firm size as log(Dsi +Esi) and efficient
firm size as log(Dˆsi+Eˆsi). Panel A shows that the efficient U.S. firm size distribution exhibits
approximately as much dispersion as the actual distribution. Of course, this result is to be
expected, given our calibration of σ. In contrast, in Panel B, we see that the efficient firm
size distribution for China has significantly fatter tails, with many Chinese firms being either
too small or too large. These size distortions in turn stem from misallocation of either the
amount or mix of financing to the affected firms.
Although the plots in Figure 1 show the firm size distributions before and after realloca-
tion, they do not illustrate the individual changes in firm size that happens with reallocation.
Figure 2 shows these movements via heat maps. Panel A contains the heat map of a three-
dimensional histogram in which the observed U.S. firm size distribution is on the x-axis and
the efficient U.S. firm size distribution is on the y-axis. The legend for the z-axis heat map is
located at right of the map and represents the number of observations in each bin. Similarly,
Panel B contains the heat map for China. From the heat maps, we can see that U.S. firms
are concentrated along the 45 degree line, where firm size before and after reallocation is
the same. In contrast, Chinese firms are much more spread out, reflecting the substantial
efficiency gains available from reallocation. Interestingly, both heat maps are more concen-
trated towards the top right than towards the bottom left. This pattern indicates that small
firms are more likely to suffer from financial misallocation than large firms.
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Next, we move on to the distortions in the prices of debt and equity that we can back
out of our estimation. Table 5 summarizes the post-distortion cost of debt (1 + τDsi) r and
equity (1 + τEsi)λ by year, again under the assumptions that γ = 2 and σ = 1.77. Panel A
contains means and Panel B contains medians. In Panel A, we find that the costs of debt
and equity fall over the sample period in the United States. In contrast, these costs rise in
China over the same time period. This pattern reinforces the result in Table 3 that points
to greater misallocation after 2004, when the NBS survey samples more firms. These extra
firms exhibit more misallocation and consequently greater costs of debt and equity. Finally,
the figures in Panel B are uniformly much smaller than those in Panel A, especially for the
Chinese firms. This result points to extreme right skewness in the distribution of the cost of
finance, implying that some firms are likely effectively barred from financial markets.
Table 6 is structured exactly as Table 5, except the sample is stratified by size instead
of year. In the United States, the average cost of debt is substantially lower for large firms,
while the cost of equity displays no clear pattern across firm size. This second result is
consistent with the well-documented lack of a size premium in equity markets in recent
years. In contrast, both the costs of debt and equity are dramatically lower for large Chinese
firms in comparison to small Chinese firms.
Beyond analyzing the cost of debt and equity by year and firm size, we run two descriptive
OLS regressions on our sample of Chinese firms to examine how these costs vary by firm
characteristics. Specifically, we regress the cost of debt and equity respectively on location,
state investment, firm size, time, and firm age. Location is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
a firm is located in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, or Guangzhou and 0 otherwise. These four
Chinese cities are also known as first tier cities and are the most developed in China. State
investment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a non-zero percentage of paid-in-
capital from state sources and 0 otherwise. However, note that all firms in our sample are
private. The dummy variable just indicates whether there is any state investment. Foreign
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investment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a non-zero percentage of paid-in-
capital from foreign sources and 0 otherwise. Next, size is the log of total assets measured
in 2005 CNY. Finally, time is a simple linear time trend, and young is a dummy variable
which equals 1 if the firm is three or fewer years old and 0 otherwise.
Table 7 presents the results. We find that costs are significantly lower for larger firms,
and this result confirms our cross-sectional sorts by size in Table 6. Firms operating in first
tier Chinese cities also face lower costs. Surprisingly, firms with non-zero state investment
actually face slightly higher costs on average. It is important to note that this result is
conditional on firm size. If we break down the total set of firms into those with and without
state paid-in-capital, we find that firms with state paid-in-capital have lower costs. However,
these firms are also significantly larger, so the effect of state investment on costs reverses
once we control for size. Foreign investment, on the other hand, is associated with higher
costs of debt but lower costs of equity. Next, the positive coefficient on the time trend reflects
the increasing costs also evident in Table 5. Finally, young firms actually face slightly lower
costs of debt and equity.
Table 8 offers another robustness check of the model. In all of our work thus far, we have
measured the nominal benefit of finance using value-added. A natural alternative measure
is the sum of the market values of debt and equity. Of course, we cannot use this measure
in our sample of Chinese firms, as most of these firms are not publicly traded. However, we
look at the measure in our sample of U.S. firms. We find that overall reallocation gains are
similar in magnitude to those in Table 3. One exception can be found during the dot-com
boom, in which we find more misallocation.
5. Conclusion
This paper entertains the possibility that finance may be misallocated in the cross-section
of firms. We explore this hypothesis using a tractable model of differentiated firms based
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on Hsieh and Klenow (2009). In our framework, the optimal allocation of debt and equity
equates the marginal benefit of these two securities within an industry. Thus, observed
dispersion in the marginal benefit of debt and marginal benefit of equity is symptomatic of
misallocation.
Our evidence points only to modest potential reallocation gains in the United States,
with American firms standing to gain only 10-13% in terms of aggregate real firm value if
they were to move to an efficient allocation. Our results are much more dramatic for China,
where firms stand to gain over 60% from moving to the efficient allocation. If China was
able to achieve the more reasonable U.S. level of efficiency, gains of 40-55% would still be
possible. When we break this figure down by the amount versus the type of finance, we find
that nearly all of this figure can be attributed to the amount of finance and little to the mix
of securities used to fund a firm’s operations.
Our work sheds light on the interaction between productive and financial allocation and
the puzzling persistence of productive misallocation. Here, Banerjee and Moll (2010) show
in a model that productive misallocation along the intensive margin should disappear within
several years. Yet Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that this type of misallocation has not
dissipated over time. The financial misallocation we investigate in this paper may be related
to productive misallocation and can help explain this puzzle. For instance, debt financing
might be more conducive to capital investment, and if financial frictions are persistent, the
misallocation of productive factors should be as well. Overall, we believe that productivity
losses can result both from the misallocation of debt and equity and from the misallocation
of capital and labor. We leave to further work for an analysis of these forms of misallocation
together in a unified framework.
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Appendix
Aggregate price
We begin by solving for the aggregate price P as a function of sector price Ps, where P is de-
fined to be the minimum price of acquiring a unit of the aggregate benefit. The minimization
problem is mathematically stated as:
min
Fs
{∑
s
PsFs
}
, (20)
subject to:
∏
s
F θss = F¯ . (21)
The Lagrangian is:
L = −
∑
s
PsFs +M
[∏
s
F θss − F¯
]
, (22)
where M is the Lagrange multiplier. The first-order condition with respect to Fs gives:
Ps = Mθs
∏
s F
θs
s
Fs
, (23)
which simplifies to:
PsFs
θs
= PF (24)
because M = P . After aggregation of sectors in the economy, we can write the aggregate
price as a function of sector price:
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P =
∏
s
(
Ps
θs
)θs
. (25)
Sector price
In a similar fashion, we can solve for the sector price Ps as a function of firm price Psi,
where Ps is defined to be the minimum price of acquiring a unit of the sector benefit. The
minimization problem is mathematically stated as:
min
Fsi
{∑
i
PsiFsi
}
, (26)
subject to:
(∑
i
F
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
= F¯s. (27)
The Lagrangian is:
Ls = −
∑
i
PsiFsi +Ms
(∑
i
F
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
− F¯s
 (28)
where Ms is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order condition with respect to Fsi gives:
Psi = Ms
(∑
i
F
σ−1
σ
si
) 1
σ−1
F
− 1
σ
si (29)
which simplifies to:
P σsiFsi = P
σ
s Fs (30)
because Ms = Ps. After aggregation of firms in a sector, we can write the sector price as a
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function of firm price:
Ps =
(∑
i
P
−(σ−1)
si
)− 1
σ−1
. (31)
Firm’s problem
A firm i in sector s chooses price Psi, debt Dsi, and equity Esi to maximize the nominal
net benefit of finance pisi. The debt and equity decision aims to minimize the total cost of
finance for a given level of real benefit F¯si, and can be separated from the price decision.
Formally, the minimization problem is:
min
Dsi,Esi
{(1 + τDsi) rDsi + (1 + τEsi)λEsi} , (32)
subject to:
Asi
(
αsD
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)E
γ−1
γ
si
) γ
γ−1
= F¯si. (33)
After setting up the Lagrangian and taking the first order conditions respect to Dsi and
Esi, we arrive at the following optimal debt-equity ratio:
Dsi
Esi
=
(
αs
1− αs
(1 + τEsi)λ
(1 + τDsi) r
)γ
. (34)
To simplify notation, let:
Zsi =
(
αs
1− αs
(1 + τEsi)λ
(1 + τDsi) r
)γ
(35)
so that the optimal ratio can be rewritten as:
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Dsi
Esi
= Zsi. (36)
Debt and equity can thus be expressed as linear functions of the real benefit, as follows:
Dsi =
F¯si
Asi
(
αs + (1− αs)Z−
γ−1
γ
si
)− γ
γ−1
Esi =
F¯si
Asi
(
αsZ
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)
)− γ
γ−1
(37)
Then using the above expressions for debt and equity, the minimum cost function becomes
a function of the fixed real benefit F¯si:
C(F¯si) = (1 + τDsi) rDsi + (1 + τEsi)λEsi
= CsiF¯si,
(38)
where
Csi =
1
Asi
(
(1 + τDsi) r
(
αs + (1− αs)Z−
γ−1
γ
si
)− γ
γ−1
+ (1 + τEsi)λ
(
αsZ
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)
)− γ
γ−1
)
.
(39)
Next, we choose Psi to maximize the nominal net benefit of finance, that is:
max
Psi
{pisi} = max
Psi
{PsiFsi − CsiFsi} . (40)
Recall from the sector price derivation that firm real benefit is a function of sector price,
firm price, and sector real benefit, Fsi =
(
Ps
Psi
)σ
Fs. Therefore, the firm’s real benefit is just
a function of price once the optimal debt-equity ratio is computed, and the firm faces a
downward sloping demand curve. The maximization problem is bounded due to downward
sloping demand even though the firm has constant returns to scale. From the first order
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condition on price we find:
Psi =
σ
σ − 1Csi. (41)
Note that the price is a fixed markup over marginal cost and a higher elasticity of substitution
between firms in a sector lowers the price the firm can charge for the real benefit it is
generating.
Taxes
To solve for the tax distortions, the nominal benefit of finance should first be written as:
PsiFsi = PsF
1
σ
s F
σ−1
σ
si . (42)
The marginal nominal benefit of debt must equal the marginal nominal cost of debt for
the maximizing firm, so the first order condition with respect to Dsi gives:
PsF
1
σ
s
σ − 1
σ
F
− 1
σ
si Asi
(
αsD
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)E
γ−1
γ
si
) γ
γ−1−1
αsD
− 1
γ
si = (1 + τDsi) r (43)
which simplifies to:
Dsi = αs
σ − 1
σ
PsiFsi
(1 + τDsi) r
1
αs + (1− αs)
(
αs
1−αs
(1+τEsi)λ
(1+τDsi)r
)−(γ−1) . (44)
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to Esi simplifies to:
Esi = (1− αs)σ − 1
σ
PsiFsi
(1 + τEsi)λ
1
αs
(
αs
1−αs
(1+τEsi)λ
(1+τDsi)r
)γ−1
+ (1− αs)
. (45)
The taxes for each firm can be backed out by solving the nonlinear system of two equations
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(44) and (45) and two unknowns τDsi and τEsi .
Efficient allocation
We now turn to the derivation of the efficient allocation in a sector. Under the efficient
allocation, total debt and total equity in a sector are kept the same, but debt and equity are
reallocated across firms in a sector to maximize sector real benefit. The debt-equity ratio
Zsi =
Ds
Es
= Zs can be shown to be the same for all firms i in sector s when debt and equity
are reallocated to achieve efficiency. The real benefit of finance can then be written as a
function of Dˆsi:
Fˆsi =
(
αs + (1− αs)Z−
γ−1
γ
s
) γ
γ−1
AsiDˆsi, (46)
where a hat above a variable indicates the efficient level after reallocation. The Lagrangian
is:
Lˆs =
∑
i
((
αs + (1− αs)Z−
γ−1
γ
s
) γ
γ−1
AsiDˆsi
)σ−1
σ

σ
σ−1
+ Mˆs
[∑
i
Dˆsi −Ds
]
(47)
where Mˆs is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order condition with respect to Dˆsi and Dˆsj
for firms i and j respectively rearranges to:
(
Dˆsi
Dˆsj
)− 1
σ
=
(
Asj
Asi
)σ−1
σ
. (48)
After aggregation, the expression above can be simplified to:
Dˆsi =
Aσ−1si∑
j A
σ−1
sj
Ds. (49)
The optimal equity allocation can be similarly derived as:
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Eˆsi =
Aσ−1si∑
j A
σ−1
sj
Es. (50)
The real benefit Fsi is assumed to be unobservable. However, Asi can be expressed as
variables obtainable from data such as the nominal benefit PsiFsi, that is:
Asi = ηs
(PsiFsi)
σ
σ−1(
αsD
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)E
γ−1
γ
si
) γ
γ−1
(51)
where
ηs =
1
Ps(PsFs)
1
σ−1
(52)
because
FsiPs(PsFs)
1
σ−1 = (PsiFsi)
σ
σ−1 . (53)
Reallocation gains are not affected if ηs is normalized to one for all sectors s.
Aggregation
The ultimate goal is to find the ratio of the aggregate real benefit computed from data over
the efficient allocation. The real benefit computed from data is given by:
Fsi = Asi
(
αsD
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)E
γ−1
γ
si
) γ
γ−1
Fs =
(∑
i
F
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
F =
∏
s
F θss ,
(54)
29
while the efficient allocation is given by:
Fˆsi = Asi
(
αsDˆ
γ−1
γ
si + (1− αs)Eˆ
γ−1
γ
si
) γ
γ−1
Fˆs =
(∑
i
Fˆ
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
Fˆ =
∏
s
Fˆ θss .
(55)
Therefore, the ratio is F/Fˆ .
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Table 5: Costs of Debt and Equity by Year
Panel A: United States China
Year (1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ (1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ
1999 0.144 0.257 0.102 0.203
(0.0022) (0.0170) (0.0010) (0.0020)
2000 0.141 0.251 0.108 0.212
(0.0021) (0.0051) (0.0027) (0.0022)
2001 0.131 0.231 0.108 0.218
(0.0022) (0.0058) (0.0008) (0.0013)
2002 0.133 0.237 0.109 0.224
(0.0021) (0.0073) (0.0005) (0.0016)
2003 0.133 0.231 0.121 0.222
(0.0030) (0.0071) (0.0010) (0.0011)
2004 0.132 0.224 0.121 0.235
(0.0024) (0.0047) (0.0007) (0.0013)
2005 0.131 0.228 0.142 0.256
(0.0026) (0.0043) (0.0009) (0.0012)
2006 0.128 0.222 0.149 0.264
(0.0021) (0.0054) (0.0009) (0.0010)
2007 0.124 0.218 0.184 0.300
(0.0030) (0.0070) (0.0023) (0.0033)
Panel B: United States China
Year (1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ (1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ
1999 0.125 0.212 0.061 0.130
(0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0003) (0.0006)
2000 0.122 0.210 0.065 0.138
(0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0003) (0.0006)
2001 0.113 0.190 0.067 0.142
(0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0002) (0.0006)
2002 0.113 0.191 0.069 0.145
(0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0002) (0.0006)
2003 0.113 0.182 0.072 0.147
(0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0002) (0.0004)
2004 0.114 0.185 0.072 0.153
(0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0002) (0.0004)
2005 0.114 0.189 0.078 0.160
(0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0002) (0.0004)
2006 0.110 0.187 0.082 0.166
(0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0002) (0.0004)
2007 0.104 0.177 0.090 0.176
(0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0009)
This table displays the estimated mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) costs
of debt (1 + τDsi) r and equity (1 + τEsi)λ in the US and China by year. The
elasticity of substitution between debt and equity is set at γ = 2. Below each
estimate, the corresponding standard error is reported in parentheses.
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Table 6: Costs of Debt and Equity by Firm Size
Panel A: United States China
Percentile (1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ (1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ
0-5 0.193 0.262 0.381 0.584
(0.0093) (0.0136) (0.0043) (0.0053)
5-15 0.165 0.258 0.210 0.382
(0.0043) (0.0088) (0.0023) (0.0027)
15-30 0.145 0.238 0.158 0.299
(0.0024) (0.0060) (0.0010) (0.0012)
30-50 0.143 0.225 0.123 0.240
(0.0018) (0.0109) (0.0004) (0.0009)
50-70 0.131 0.224 0.099 0.192
(0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0005) (0.0007)
70-85 0.113 0.245 0.080 0.156
(0.0010) (0.0050) (0.0004) (0.0006)
85-95 0.103 0.238 0.067 0.130
(0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0006)
95-100 0.096 0.201 0.060 0.113
(0.0016) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0007)
Panel B: United States China
Percentile (1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ (1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ
0-5 0.160 0.199 0.219 0.376
(0.0044) (0.0080) (0.0011) (0.0014)
5-15 0.137 0.198 0.133 0.263
(0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0004) (0.0007)
15-30 0.126 0.184 0.098 0.207
(0.0016) (0.0037) (0.0002) (0.0005)
30-50 0.125 0.176 0.077 0.164
(0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0003)
50-70 0.115 0.190 0.062 0.132
(0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0002) (0.0003)
70-85 0.106 0.203 0.053 0.110
(0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0001) (0.0003)
85-95 0.099 0.215 0.047 0.098
(0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0001) (0.0003)
95-100 0.090 0.191 0.043 0.091
(0.0022) (0.0039) (0.0002) (0.0003)
This table displays the estimated mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) costs
of debt (1 + τDsi) r and equity (1 + τEsi)λ in the US and China by firm size.
Firm size is defined to be the 0-5%, 5-15%, 15-30%, 30-50%, 50-70%, 70-85%,
85-95%, 95-100% total asset percentiles of firms in each country. The elasticity
of substitution between debt and equity is set at γ = 2. Below each estimate,
the corresponding standard error is reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: The Costs of Debt and Equity and Firm Characteristics
(1 + τDsi) r (1 + τEsi)λ
Location -0.014 -0.016
(-12.6) (-11.4)
State investment 0.015 0.014
(5.8) (4.4)
Foreign investment 0.029 -0.001
(32.2) (-0.9)
Size -0.047 -0.072
(-157.3) (-196.5)
Time 0.008 0.008
(44.8) (38.9)
Young -0.003 -0.010
(-3.7) (-10.2)
This table summarizes two OLS regressions on the costs of
debt (1 + τDsi) r and equity (1 + τEsi)λ respectively. The re-
gressors are location, state investment, firm size, time, and
firm age. Location is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a
firm is located in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, or Guangzhou
and 0 otherwise. State investment is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if a firm has a non-zero percentage of paid-in-capital
from state sources and 0 otherwise. Foreign investment is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a non-zero percent-
age of paid-in-capital from foreign sources and 0 otherwise.
Size is log total assets measured in 2005 CNY. Time is a lin-
ear time trend, and Young is a dummy variable which equals
1 if the firm is three or fewer years old and 0 otherwise. Be-
low each estimate, the corresponding t-statistic is reported in
parentheses.
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Table 8: U.S. Reallocation Gains with Market Value Benefit
United States
Year Fractional benefit Percent Gain
1999 0.768 30.2
(0.023) (3.8)
2000 0.778 28.6
(0.022) (3.5)
2001 0.873 14.6
(0.010) (1.3)
2002 0.886 12.8
(0.011) (1.3)
2003 0.894 11.8
(0.010) (1.2)
2004 0.892 12.2
(0.012) (1.5)
2005 0.890 12.3
(0.012) (1.4)
2006 0.894 11.9
(0.010) (1.2)
2007 0.878 13.9
(0.010) (1.3)
Calculations are based on U.S. firms from Compustat. The sample period is from
1999 to 2007 inclusive. The nominal benefit of finance is measured as the market
value of debt plus the market value of equity, instead of value-added. This table
presents potential reallocation gains when the substitutability between debt and
equity is γ = 2. The first column shows the observed U.S. allocation of the real
benefit of finance as a fraction of the optimal US allocation: FUS/FˆUS. The second
column shows the corresponding percentage gain from moving from the observed
to the optimal allocation. Below each estimate, the corresponding standard error
is reported in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Panel A compares the U.S. observed and efficient firm size distributions using a
kernel density estimator. Observed firm size is computed as log(Dsi+Esi), and efficient firm
size is computed as log(Dˆsi + Eˆsi), where Dsi, Esi, Dˆsi, and Eˆsi are measured in millions of
2005 USD. Panel B similarly compares the observed and efficient firm size distributions in
China. Firm size is computed in the same manner, but Dsi, Esi, Dˆsi, and Eˆsi are measured
in millions of 2005 CNY.
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Panel A:
Panel B:
Figure 2: Panel A contains the heat map of a 3D histogram where the observed U.S. firm
size distribution is on the x-axis and the efficient U.S. firm size distribution is on the y-axis.
The legend for the z-axis heat map is located at right of the plot and represents the number
of observations in each bin. Observed firm size is computed as log(Dsi + Esi), and efficient
firm size is computed as log(Dˆsi+ Eˆsi), where Dsi, Esi, Dˆsi, and Eˆsi are measured in millions
of 2005 USD. Panel B similarly compares the observed and efficient firm size distributions in
China. Firm size is computed in the same manner, but Dsi, Esi, Dˆsi, and Eˆsi are measured
in millions of 2005 CNY.
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